H4DIPLOMACY



HACKING 4 DIPLOMACY DS-17: GUARDIANS OF THE EMBASSY

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<u>Canva Link</u>

U.S. Consulate Jeddah Attack 2004



WHAT WENT WRONG?

In Jeddah, the TG Guard system was the Marine's only option.



One-time usage, difficult to re-load & re-deploy



Chemical Compounds

Black Powder Charge & Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (CS)



Placement

Due to interior and exterior locations, placement of TG Guard is limited









MEET THE TEAM



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
67 TOTAL INTERVIEWS 42 PEOPLE

Government


Private Sector

Academia

AGGREGATE INTERVIEWS



INTERVIEW BREAKDOWN






178 Embassies and 88 Consulates
Over 60 attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities

New Less-Than-Lethal System Criteria

- O1 Accessible: Easier to obtain & transport
- O2 Standardized: Across all facilities
- O3 Continuous: Repeatedly deployable & continuous dispersal
- **O4** Mountable: Cannot be tampered with





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Step 1: Angry crowd begins to form on outside of perimeter fence 2

Step 2: Perimeter breach & targeting entry points

3

Step 3: Hardline threat escalates




LEVEL 1

ANGRY CROWD BEGINS TO FORM ON OUTSIDE OF PERIMETER FENCE

Response: Establish a
Physical Presence (Current
Procedure)

- Host nation police force will be alerted in advance or called in to be stationed around the exterior perimeter
- Local Guard Force (LGF)
 contracted by the
 embassy stationed
 around the inside
 perimeter



X : Host Nation ForceX : Local Guard Force

X: Marines








LEVEL 2

PERIMETER BREACH & TARGETING ENTRY POINTS

Response: OC System
Deployment

- Crowd breaches
 perimeter and gains
 access to the compound
- OC Oleoresin Capsicum
 Chemical compound that comprises pepper spray
- Mounted continuous dispersal OC system is deployed

Perimeter Fence





tes placement of OC system


LEVEL 3


HARDLINE THREAT ESCELATES

Response: Acoustic
Deterrent System
Deployment

- 1st Hardline First entry point into the chancery
- Effects:
 - Nausea
 - Discomfort
 - Balance disruptions
- In the process of Beta testing by TDB


Perimeter Fence





**Indicates placement of acoustic system






CONCEPT DESIGN A: TOP-DOWN VIEW

Design Elements:

- O1 Localized Tanks: OC tank & compressed air tank
- **O2** Mixing valves & diverting valves
- **03** Nozzles: fan spray nozzle design


CONCEPT DESIGN B: TOP-DOWN VIEW



CONCEPT DESIGN B: TOP-DOWN VIEW

Additional Elements:


- O4 Sensors: pressure sensor for air tank & level sensor for OC tank
- O5 Ball Valves: for quick disconnects & fill point
- **06** Mixing valves & diverting valves



CONCEPT DESIGN B: LATERAL 3D VIEW

Basic 3D Model demonstrating the pipe placement above the ceiling tiles

Lateral pipeline structure maximizes ceiling space, demonstrates re-route for testing purposes



BENEFITS





LIMITATIONS & FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

LIMITATIONS

- Suggestions for placement
- Vulnerable to extreme weather
- Extremely motivated attackers
- Potential tank capacity
- Not a complete denial system

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

- TDB approval, begin process of development
- With building-specific information, STSs and SEOs can determine:
 - Volume of the tanks
 - Calculate the flow rate
 - Dispersal range
 - Duration of dispersal
- Final Design Concept
 - Alpha/Beta testing







Thank You!







